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Abstract 
This paper contributes to an empirical understanding of state formation. Based on 
an original household-level data set, we provide a detailed picture of the process of 
state formation in Afghanistan over the last decade. State formation happens when 
state and society engage in reciprocal relations. Central to this relationship is an 
exchange of services for the acceptance of authority and increased legitimacy. Our 
data allows us to assess state-society relations across different dimensions. We 
focus on the provision of services, on the responsiveness of the state, on conflict 
regulation and on taxation. In result we find more evidence of state formation than 
expected but also see this as a contested process that unfolds unevenly and with 
different speed across different sectors. 
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Introduction 
Increasing the resilience of states affected by conflict and fragility is the declared 
goal of the international community. Yet, while there is no shortage of normative 
and prescriptive treatments of why and how this should be done, empirical 
accounts of what actually happens (or fails to happen) when state building hits the 
ground are remarkably rare. 
This paper contributes to an empirical understanding of state formation 
under the specific condition of an intentional, initially foreign actors driven, state 
building agenda. Based on an original household-level data set, we provide a 
detailed picture of the process of state formation in Afghanistan over the last 
decade. We describe how Afghan rural society interacts with the newly emerging 
state in Afghanistan, and also with the international actors – military and civilian – 
who support the Afghan state in its military struggle against the Taliban, and in its 
developmental struggle for a viable state. 
In terms of the statistics provided the paper is descriptive in nature: we 
intend to provide an empirically grounded account of complex processes of state-
society interaction in a highly internationalised post-war context. The results of the 
descriptive statistics are analysed and interpreted based on qualitative research in 
the local context. Such a descriptive, empirical research narrative helps us take 
stock of what has been achieved in Afghanistan, and can also serve as an 
important prerequisite for the development of causal questions about the effects of 
state building interventions. The implications of this paper therefore extend 
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beyond Afghanistan and apply to many cases of state building and state emergence 
in fragile and conflict affected states. 
The article proceeds as follows. We start with situating this research in the 
literature on state formation and state society relations, with an emphasis on recent 
policy approaches by international donors. Next, we briefly discuss the Afghan 
context. Then we introduce our original data set from surveys conducted between 
2007 and 2015 and provide descriptive statistical insights on state-society 
relations. We end with a discussion on state formation in Afghanistan. 
State building, state formation, and the social contract  
Accounts of state building and state formation more generally come in a wide 
variety, but most converge on a common core – the social contract. From political 
philosophers of the enlightenment such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-
Jacques Rousseau to the OECD-DAC in the twenty-first century, theorists and 
practitioners of state building have emphasised the importance of a contract 
between the state and its subjects, by which subjects accept the authority of the 
state in exchange for public goods and services as well as a guarantee of individual 
rights.1 
The OECD report, ‘State-Building in Situations of Fragility’, puts the 
social contract at the heart of state building.2 The OECD argues that social 
contracts emerge from the interaction between a society’s expectations of the state, 
the capacity of the state to provide goods and services, including security, and the 
state’s ability to generate resources from its population and territory to fund those 
4 
 
goods and services. Furthermore, the OECD explaines that these interactions are 
mediated by institutionalised political processes that bind state and society 
together. Importantly, legitimacy plays a key role in this interaction. Legitimacy 
refers to generalised trust in government based in the belief that its authority is 
justified. Legitimacy enables and facilitates the exchange of services for the 
acceptance of authority; once such an exchange has developed into repeated 
interactions, legitimacy will replenish itself. It is hoped that states that acquire the 
capacity to provide services are rewarded with increased citizen compliance, 
which in turn generates more legitimacy. The key to successful state building is 
therefore to jump-start such a virtuous circle.3 Many international donors have 
subscribed to this model of state building, including the UN in Afghanistan, and 
consequently stress the importance of service delivery as one tool for acquiring 
legitimacy and authority, both of which are seen as requisites for state building.4 
Evidently, service delivery via a rational state bureaucracy is not the only 
way to generate legitimacy. According to Max Weber´s seminal classification, 
other sources of legitimate authority are tradition and charisma.5 Furthermore, 
modern political theory has emphasised the importance of procedural legitimacy. 
In difference to the output-induced legitimacy based on public goods and services, 
procedural legitimacy is based on effective and inclusive institutions solving 
problems and processing conflicts within societies.6 A highly relevant and 
specialised case of such input legitimacy stems from democratic procedures, with 
elections and institutional safeguards against abuse of power as its defining 
characteristic.7  
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International donors are aware of these other sources of legitimacy, but 
given their timeframes, tool-box and sobering experience with over-ambitious 
liberal peace building of the post-1990’s area, it is not surprising that many 
emphasise the importance of increasing output or performance legitimacy through 
increased service delivery. After all, it is quite plausible that aid has tangible 
impacts on perceived service delivery,8 whereas many studies cast doubt on the 
assumption that aid can be effective in bringing democratic accountability.9  
However, the nascent state and its international backers are not the only 
actors seeking to gain legitimacy. Many accounts of state-society relations in 
developing countries demonstrated that would-be state builders often face 
tremendous obstacles because they have to compete with societal organizations – 
militias, tribes, clans, religious authorities, ethnic groups, business associations 
and so on – for legitimacy and authority. In other words, governments looking to 
engage society in sustained ‘contractual’ relations may realise that they are not the 
only actors. As Migdal so convincingly showed, the state is not an autonomous 
actor, but rather deeply embedded in social forces.10 Moreover, the state is not the 
only actor in 'doing the state', but there are numerous societal actors that cooperate 
and compete with the state for authority and legitimacy.11 The reality of state-
formation is that it produces various degrees of resistance, but also tolerates 
pockets of autonomy where societal actors exercise authority that belongs to a 
centralised bureaucracy, in a Weberian ideal state.12 Emerging patterns of state-
formation are therefore hybrid in the sense that states operate along non-state 
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actors and organizations, in various constellations of cooperation, mutual 
avoidance, or even competition.13  
Current empirical research on state-formation has not answered to what 
extent and under what conditions increased service delivery can contribute to a 
social contract. Additionally, it has yet to determine which other factors may 
contribute to reciprocal state-society relations, which patterns of state-society 
relations emerge as a result, and whether those patterns are ‘contractual’ and stable 
or volatile and reversible. It is highly plausible that processes of state-formation 
and the emergence of reciprocal state-society relations are non-linear and 
dependent on many contingent factors: the specific expectations of society, the 
nature and quality of the services, which actors are associated with the delivery of 
those services and the willingness of society to actually engage in contractual 
relations with the state. In the next section, we will argue that much of 
Afghanistan’s modern history is that of a rural society that often chose not to 
engage in contractual relations with the central government, and at times opted for 
avoidance or even resistance when the state attempted to increase its presence in 
rural areas. Against this historical backdrop and using our original data, we then 
describe the most recent attempt at state building in Afghanistan. 
 
A historical perspective of state formation in Afghanistan  
Afghanistan is arguably one of the most challenging environments for state 
building. Thomas Barfield’s history of Afghanistan describes how the political 
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structure of modern Afghanistan was characterised by a lack of involvement by 
the subject population, as well as by a small and closed ruling class which only 
had to fear competition from within the ruling elite or from outside invaders.14 In 
ordinary peace times there were very few social and political ties between state 
and society. The Afghan state was neither capable enough to establish dominance, 
nor did it have a social contract in place between the rulers and ruled. In fact, 
during much of Afghanistan’s modern history, the state had little need for a social 
contract with its citizens because it was a typical rentier state that financed itself 
by rents from foreign powers; prominently among them the British and their rivals, 
then the US and the Soviet Union, and most recently the coalition of Western 
donors.15 
This pattern of parallel coexistence and state-society disengagement 
occasionally changed, argues Barfield, when invasions by foreign powers led to 
widespread popular resistance. In the 19th century, the Afghan state expelled the 
British by empowering rural tribesmen. However, the success of these militias, 
formed around regional or tribal affiliations, made the country even less 
governable in the long run because the central state was too weak to re-establish 
its authority over its armed subjects. 
In the 20th century Afghan elites tried repeatedly to establish central 
authority over the patchwork of regions, tribes and ethnic groups, and twice this 
led to an uprising and a civil war. Amir Abdur Rahman’s aggressive push to 
extend state-control from its base in Kabul almost to the borders of modern 
Afghanistan was met with violent resistance in parts of the country.16 This 
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resistance was crushed with devastating effects for some minorities.17 Abdur 
Rahman´s successor, King Amanullah, pursued a more inclusive and less 
repressive attempt at centralisation, modelled on Atta Turks reforms in Turkey, but 
was also eventually met with resistance from conservative forces in rural Afghan 
society and forced to abandon the throne in 1929.18 A new attempt at centralisation 
and forced modernisation was made by the Afghan communist party with the help 
of the Soviet Union after a coup d’état in 1978. Again, this led to a massive violent 
mobilisation of society. When the Soviet military intervention ended in 1989, the 
country was in the hands of competing armed groups, with no institutional 
foundations for rebuilding the state.  
The most recent attempt at creating a modern, centralised state that would 
have the capability to penetrate society was launched in 2002 after the ousting of 
the Taliban. The international community installed Hamid Karzai as leader of the 
new Afghan regime. In 2004, a new constitution was adopted that created – on 
paper – one of the most centralised states in today's world, with a dominant 
president who could appoint provincial and district governors, police commanders, 
and many other officials without much consultation. Once the formal trappings of 
statehood were in place, the international community began very generously to 
bankroll Afghanistan’s attempts at state building. Between 2002 and 2012, 
international donors have allocated a staggering of 47.2 billion USD in official 
development assistance.19 
Despite this financial effort and despite the formal concentration of 
executive power in the hands of ‘the palace’ (the presidential administration), the 
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reach of the Afghan state remained very limited. The ‘palace’ had neither the 
capabilities nor the will to engage with society in a violent and oppressive way. It 
is also unlikely that the international backers would have supported an overly 
forceful strategy. At least on paper, state building in Afghanistan had to conform 
to standards of good governance, democratic participation and local ownership. 
Given its internal weakness and external constraints, the new regime had to rely on 
a pragmatic and accommodating strategy that employed bargaining and co-
optation in order to establish a neo-patrimonial system. As Mukhopadhyay 
observes, the political centre in Kabul was ‘operating largely in the neo-
patrimonial image, and, much like many of its predecessors, forging links to the 
countryside through partnerships with power holders who could sometimes expand 
the scope of the state by engaging it’.20 The resources of the international 
community most certainly helped maintain the networks of patronage that are still 
at the core of governance in Afghanistan.21 
 
How to witness state formation as it happens? 
Using household-level data, this paper intends to provide an empirically rich 
description of how state-formation evolves. State-formation happens when state 
and society engage in reciprocal relations. Central to this relationship is an 
exchange of services for the acceptance of authority and increased legitimacy. In 
order to witness state-formation as it happens, we thus need an empirical strategy 
to gauge the extent of state-society engagement. 
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Evidently, the areas where such engagement takes place will very much 
depend on the context. In many developing states, state-society engagement is 
minimal; society may be too poor to be a relevant source of tax income, or it may 
be too paralyzed to pose a credible threat to the elites, hence no effort is made to 
provide services. Nevertheless, even under such extreme circumstances there will 
be some form of mutual engagement between political elites and the population. 
No state can uphold the image of the state without at least some engagement with 
its citizens.22 The international expectations and norms which demand that states 
provide at least some services to their population are too dominant to ignore. 
Under all but rarest of circumstances will the population expect anything less than 
some baseline level of services from the state, mainly security and the provision of 
basic public goods. The main objective of the massive international engagement in 
Afghanistan is precisely to enable the state to provide these services. 
Our rich data allows us to empirically assess state-society relations across 
eight dimensions. These dimensions are all important aspects of state-society 
relations. Together, they allow us to empirically grasp the contours of the social 
contract. 
The philosophers of the enlightenment, the international community, and 
most certainly the Afghans themselves agree that basic security is a crucially 
important service that the state is expected to facilitate.23 We therefore assess the 
contributions of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and for the sake of 
comparison, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to security. 
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We then investigate perceptions of police performance, since policing is 
arguably another crucial domain of the state. We use a performance-based 
measure by asking whether the police contributed to better security. 
We ask about the provision of basic services. Specifically, we ask whether 
the Afghan government contributed to better roads and bridges, better access to 
clean drinking water, better elementary schooling, improvements in the 
agricultural sectors, and increased availability of electricity. Most developing 
states allocate a large part of their budgets to these sectors because of the 
important contribution to the livelihoods of the rural population which can be 
attained. To compare, we investigate to what extent international actors were seen 
to contribute to these sectors. For both, measures of security and contributions to 
sectors, we think it is important to differentiate between the potentially different 
influence of state-attributed vs. foreign organisation-attributed actions on state 
emergence.  
Next, we measure the responsiveness of the sub-national administration. 
We asked respondents to assess if the district administration (wolliswoli) and 
provincial administration take care of the needs of the village community. This 
question directly refers to performance legitimacy, which as we have argued, is the 
preferred source of legitimacy of international donors. 
Another important public good which states are expected to provide are 
reliable institutions for managing conflicts. Hence we inquire to what extent state 
institutions (as opposed to other societal actors) manage local conflicts. We focus 
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on conflicts about natural resources, because this type of conflict and its fallouts 
frequently affect rural Afghan communities.24 
Finally, we look into taxation. We explore whether respondents pay taxes 
to the government, which would be a sign of an emerging social contract, or to 
competing societal actors. Table 1 gives an overview of these dimensions and 
shows how we measure them. 
 
Table 1. Empirical dimensions of state-society relations. 
Data 
We use original data that was collected through five surveys in spring 2007, 2009, 
2011, 2013 and 2015.25 Interviews were conducted in 80 villages with a total of 
2000 respondents (heads of household) per wave.26 Response rates were very high 
in all five waves (90% or higher). The communities involved are located in four 
districts of North East Afghanistan, within the provinces of Kunduz and Takhar: 
Imam Sahib, Aliabad, Warsaj and Taloqan. Half of the communities were selected 
by random sampling. The remaining 50 per cent were selected according to their 
diversity on five criteria: (1) size; (2) remoteness; (3) estimated natural resource 
base (access to irrigated or rain-fed land, access to pastures, access to forest); (4) 
estimated vulnerability to natural disasters; and (5) ethnic and religious 
composition. Within the communities, we randomly selected a representative 
sample of households for every wave.27 Our sample is designed to reveal micro-
level dynamics and is intended to be representative at the community level. The 
13 
 
survey consisted of 66 questions addressing respondents’ perceptions of: the 
performance of the government, international development agencies, military 
actors, as well as threats and security.  
Pitfalls of survey-based research, and some remedies 
Our evidence stems predominantly from household surveys, which report 
perceptions of respondents. This naturally raises the question of validity, as 
answers might be systematically biased. However, we are solely interested in 
describing the extent to which a social contract has emerged. As we have seen, the 
notion of a social contract centres on societal expectations and how these are met 
by the state. Perception-based measures are therefore adequate, even if they may 
not reflect the real amount of services provided. 
The challenge from systematic bias of respondent’s answers becomes 
relevant as soon as we seek to identify the causal mechanisms leading to a social 
contract. For example, respondents may, for various reasons, under- or over-report 
the actual amount of services received. Respondents may rate the state’s 
performance based on its efforts rather than on its real achievements, which would 
lead to a more positive assessment than the actual service delivery warrants. In a 
quantitative study across Africa, Latin America, and Asia, Sacks finds evidence 
for such a mechanism.28 Or, respondents may rate the state’s performance based 
on unrealistically high expectations which will likely be disappointed, leading to a 
more negative assessment than the actual service delivery warrants. It is also 
possible that respondents rate the state’s performance based on worldview and 
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ideological inclinations, which may be unrelated to service delivery. In such a 
case, more and better services will not result in more legitimacy. 
In short, respondents’ answers to survey questions might be biased by 
cognitive frames. Triangulating perceptional survey data with other independent 
data can help to identify such systematic biases. When presenting our results, we 
therefore complement the survey data with insights from qualitative data, 
primarily from over 200 semi-structured interviews conducted in the same 
research districts of Afghanistan.29 
The changing conditions for state-formation in Afghanistan30 
When interpreting the data, it is important to be aware that the five survey waves 
were conducted in different contexts. The first wave, in 2007, was primarily 
characterised by a stable security situation. The international military forces – 
mainly German in our target region – used military restraint and the emphasis was 
on dialogue and reconstruction efforts. Insurgent activity was very limited. 
Moreover, the presence of international forces was sufficient to deter the many 
local informal armed groups. Afghans enjoyed a time of considerable stability and 
security. Accordingly, the 2007 survey showed that respondents felt safe, and that 
they positively assessed the contribution of foreign military forces to security in 
the region.  
In 2009 when we ran the second survey wave this context had 
fundamentally changed. Insurgent activity had substantially increased. Local 
Afghan commanders, with US support, started to set up militia groups to counter 
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insurgent activity. While full scale fighting had not escalated at the time of the 
survey, it was clearly anticipated by our interlocutors in the target region. The 
anxiety with regard to a military escalation of insurgency and counter insurgency 
measures led to a steep increase in fear levels as well as a significant drop in the 
positive security effect attributed to foreign forces.31  
The third survey, in spring 2011, was conducted during the US-led surge of 
foreign force presence, and was the worst period of local security of all four 
waves. Intense fighting between insurgents on the one hand, and ISAF, Afghan 
National Security Forces (ANSF) and mostly still informal militias (locally 
referred to as arbakee) on the other hand was frequent in 2011.32 Respondents in 
2011 continued to feel very threatened and the perceptions of ISAF’s effects on 
security dropped to an all-time low. 
When the fourth survey wave was carried out in spring 2013, the security 
situation had improved considerably, and the transition to Afghan security 
responsibility was well on the way. Accordingly, our data shows a more positive 
assessment of security and lower threat levels compared to 2011.  
When the final survey wave of spring 2015 was implemented, the ISAF 
had just been assigned to history, most international combat forces had left 
Afghanistan and the remaining contingent operated under a training and equipping 
mandate (Resolute Support). At the time of the survey security was deteriorating 
again, the insurgents had recaptured sub-districts they controlled before the surge 
in 2011 and even managed to widen their reach. The security situation was, 
however, very different for different provinces (compare the trend for Kunduz and 
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Takhar below). The ANSF had not fallen apart as some observers predicted and 
did confront the Taliban threat. At the same time the Afghan unity government, 
after nearly a year of political infighting and resulting limbo, had been formed and 
preparations for peace negotiations with main Taliban groups were ongoing.  
Figure 1 shows the development of security incidents in our target 
provinces.33 
 
 
Figure 1. Security incidents in Kunduz and Takhar. 
 
 
The same trend is also reflected in respondents’ assessment of security in 
their villages. When respondents were asked ‘Has security increased or decreased 
over the past two years in your village?’ we noted the following trends. In 2007, 
98.6% said that village security had ‘somewhat improved’ or ‘very much 
improved’ compared to the previous two years. Cleary, respondents in 2007 
compared the situation with the war years and the subsequent warlord governance, 
which explains these very high numbers. In 2009, still 77.0% of respondents 
thought that village security had ‘somewhat improved’ or ‘very much improved.’ 
In 2011, reflecting the dynamic of insurgent and counterinsurgent violence, this 
number dramatically dropped to 17.5%, but climbed again to 58.6% by 2013 only 
to drop again to 35.0% in 2015. 
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Descriptive evidence of state-formation 
Provision of security: ANA, ISAF, and the Afghan Police 
‘Probably no important changes will our district have after the Foreigner 
troop’s withdrawal by 2014 and the government opponents will also be 
satisfied after foreigner troop’s withdrawal; the national police and 
national army are able to take security in the country and there will be no 
problems.’34 
 
‘After the withdrawal of international forces; the government of 
Afghanistan is not able to provide security; because the government is 
weak and they won’t be able to pay the expenses of army and police.’35 
 
Providing security to its population is arguably the most fundamental task that 
states have to fulfil. No state can hope to earn legitimacy as long as citizens think 
that the state is not capable or unwilling to protect its citizens. This is even more 
accentuated in countries emerging from war.  
Our data show how Afghans assess the contribution to security of three 
important actors: The Afghan National Army (ANA), the ANP (Afghan National 
Police), and ISAF (see Figure 2). 
With regard to the ANA, we find that by 2009, 60.8% of respondents said 
that the ANA had positively contributed to security. By 2011, this number 
increased slightly to 62.9% and by 2013 to an impressive 89.5%. In 2015, against 
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the backdrop of ISAFs closure and withdrawal of most foreign combat forces still 
77.4% of respondents assessed the security contribution of ANA positively. 
Assessments of the ANP (police) are similarly positive. In 2007, 92.0% 
agreed with the notion that the police contributed positively to the security of the 
community. In 2009 this number was largely unchanged at 92.6%; in 2011, we 
observe a dip as the number falls to 69.8%, reflecting the deterioration of the 
security situation that we observe in our target region, but in 2013, the number 
rose again to 91.1% to drop to 78.8% in 2015. 
The difference between ANA and ANP perception are likely related to two 
aspects: the police was more or less continuously present at district level (however 
only over time as a formal state body under central command) while the army was 
less visible since it was built from scratch and because of their organisation and 
function as barracked units. 
The trend for ISAF is very different. Initially, respondents assessed ISAF’s 
contribution to security as overwhelmingly positive. In 2007, 79.8% of 
respondents said the foreign forces had positively contributed to security. But in 
2009, against the backdrop of insurgent violence and counterinsurgent measures, 
numbers had dropped to 60.6% and when fighting started in earnest in 2011, it had 
dropped to 5.6%. By 2013, the figure increased slightly to 14.3% and, with ISAF’s 
wind down, stood at 4.7% in 2015.  
 
Figure 2: Did the following actors have an impact on security? Positive responses. 
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In sum, we see that the assessment for the contribution of the ANA to 
security is high and even improves over time, while the equally positive 
assessment of the police shows a small dip in 2011 when security deteriorated. By 
contrast, the assessment of ISAF, which was initially very high, dropped 
massively in 2011 and barely recovered before the end of the mission. 
These numbers strongly suggest that Afghan and Western actors are 
assessed quite differently: Western actors appear to take the full blame for the 
deteriorating security situation in 2009 – 2011, while Afghan actors are far less 
penalised. We see two possible reasons for the massive dip that ISAF takes in 
2009 and 2011. Firstly, the cycle of insurgent and counterinsurgent violence, 
which increased communities’ exposure to the immediate experience of war, was 
mainly attributed to ISAF, and not to ANA. Such an assessment is not without 
foundation, since US Special Forces typically played the most active part in 
counterinsurgency operations, even if they often included Afghan units in 
missions. In fact, foreign forces became a source of insecurity for most 
respondents. This shows up in the data as the percentage of respondents who said 
that they were ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ afraid of foreign forces increased from 4.9% 
in 2007 to 80.2% in 2013 and stood still at 49.7% after the end of combat 
operations in 2015.  
Secondly, we also observe during this period an ideological backlash 
against Western actors. When asked whether respondents agreed with the 
statement, ‘the presence of foreign troops is threatening local customs and Islamic 
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values in our community’, 43.5% indicated that they ‘rather’ or ‘fully’ agreed in 
2007; this number increased to 86.6% in 2013 and only slightly dropped to 82.0% 
in 2015.  
Our qualitative interviews suggest that the growing scepticism towards 
Western security actors not only reflects disappointment about the lack of security, 
but is also connected to an abstract and general discussion of (Western) foreign 
presence and power in a society that defines itself in moral terms via Islam and 
Afghan traditions. This discourse is neither an expression of specific and concrete 
experiences with international actors, nor an overall negative assessment of the 
contributions of these actors. But it reflects an increasingly important narrative 
that depicts the Western forces as at war with Islam. Events (or rumours about 
events) such as the burning of the Quran and mocking the prophet in caricatures 
fuelled such a narrative, and many Afghans began to feel that the military presence 
followed ulterior and destructive motives.  
While deteriorating security seriously tainted the assessment of Western 
actors, the assessment of Afghan actors remained high. Quite possibly, the 
assessment of governmental security actors is filtered through a positive vision, 
reflecting expectations, hopes or pride in the tangible manifestation of a newly-
emerging nation state. High ratings can thus be seen as an endorsement for the 
idea of the state, and as a high demand for statehood. It is this a-priori goodwill 
that makes governmental security services less prone to negative assessments 
when security objectively deteriorates. Additionally, the positive assessment of 
Afghan security forces, we think, also reflects objective improvements in the 
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effectiveness of the Afghan security forces. By 2015, the Afghan police force had 
grown to 160,000 and the Afghan army to 170-185,000 (the exact numbers are 
disputed)36, and were widely perceived by our respondents and interview partners 
to have a stabilising effect.  
These perception based findings may seem counter-intuitive for observers 
more familiar with human rights and corruption focussed reports on the Afghan 
Security forces based on anecdotal evidence. Our research adds an important 
qualification of ANA, ANP and state perceptions. While perceptions are not all 
positive (care of the district administration is relatively low, corruption perceptions 
are relatively high, both are not improving dramatically) fear of the state is low 
and security contribution perceptions are high. This is consistent throughout our 
12 year research experience in the north-eastern provinces covered. Here, Afghans 
seem to like to see rather more than less of their state and consider the state not as 
the critical problem but still rather a requested potential solution to problems.37  
It remains to be seen how sustainable these achievements will in the 
coming years, when international assistance and funding is likely to continue to 
decrease. As illustrated by the two quotations at the beginning of this section the 
views of our Afghan interview partners in the guideline interviews of 2012/13 also 
diverged on this issue. However, nearly twice as many references indicated 
optimism rather than pessimism towards the ability of Afghan security forces to 
provide security after the withdrawal of foreign forces (87 vs 48 of coded 
references). 
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Provisions of basic services by government and by international development 
actors 
‘Afghanistan [sees] development every day. […] The old government 
tyrannized [the] people. They didn’t consult with people in governmental 
decisions. But now we have democracy […] in our country. People share 
their ideas freely without any fear. People cooperate together on 
developmental projects.’38 
 
The provision of basic services is another crucially important function that states 
are expected to fulfil and is thus an important part of the social contract between 
rulers and ruled.39 Almost 30 years of war have left rural Afghanistan partly 
devastated and very poor. Between 2002 and 2012, international donors allocated 
47.2 billion USD in official development assistance.40 By 2004, some of these aid 
flows began to reach rural Afghanistan. Most aid that reached the countryside was 
humanitarian aid and investment in small infrastructure projects aimed at 
improving farmers’ livelihoods. Initially, development organisations engaged 
directly with communities, but with the establishment of provincial and then 
district administration, donors started to work also with and through sub-national 
government bodies. At the same time, the donor-financed but state-run National 
Solidarity Programme succeeded in organising communities countrywide into 
elected Community Development Councils (CDCs) that later formed District 
Development Assemblies (DDAs); for the first time Afghanistan had elected 
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formal community representatives engaging with the state on development related 
issues.  
Most donors in Afghanistan subscribe to the idea that development 
assistance should, whenever possible, not bypass the state, but contribute to 
strengthening the state’s capacity and legitimacy vis-à-vis Afghan society. It is 
evident that development in rural Afghanistan is financed almost exclusively by 
donors. However, this does not prevent Afghans from attributing some of the 
progress to their own government; either because donors successfully work 
through the state, or because Afghan respondents see the state as the enabler for 
development even if it is not processed through state budgets.  
We asked respondents to rate the contribution of the Afghan government in 
providing basic services such as drinking water, roads, schooling, agricultural 
production, and electricity. Two interesting observations can be made (see Table 2 
for details). 
First, between 2007 and 2015, the share of respondents who thought that 
the government and international development actors contributed to better services 
increased. In 2015, as compared to 2007, many more respondents thought that the 
government contributed to improvements across all sectors. A similar trend can be 
observed for development actors.  
Second, back in 2007 many respondents credited development actors with 
progress across all sectors, but only very few thought that the government also 
contributed to development progress. By 2015, this had changed. The Afghan 
government was now as likely or more likely to be credited with progress in 
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access to drinking water and schooling. Sectors where progress is still mostly 
credited to development actors are agricultural production, roads and electricity 
provision. 
These numbers indicate that Afghan households recognise that very 
significant progress has been made across many sectors, and that respondents 
appreciate the efforts made by international development actors and increasingly 
by the government. Not even the deterioration of the security situation in 2009 – 
2011, which left so many traces across our data, seems to have affected this sense 
of progress. Equally surprising is that respondents think that the government has 
caught up with development actors. By 2015, progress is almost equally attributed 
to development actors and to the government. This does perhaps not reflect the 
real contribution of the Afghan state, but refers to the perception of an enabling 
state. However, the data clearly suggest that this perceived state has so far met the 
demands and expectations of the rural population with regard to the provision of 
basic services. This general appreciation of development induced positive change 
is also supported by our guideline interviews in 2012/13: most interview partners 
acknowledge positive changes but many worry about the sustainability of those 
changes if external development aid will subside.  
 
Table 2. Percentage of respondents who fully or rather agree that government or 
development actors contributed to better quality / better access to services. 
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Responsiveness of sub-national administration 
‘Briberies and corruptions reach to a high level. Those who has a patron 
or supporter can reach to his\her dreams and do any things that he\she 
wants but those who does not have supporter must sit back.’41 
 
‘But as we see now the state has established a good relation with villages 
via NSP [National Solidarity Programme] and has eliminated [the] Arbabs 
system and the people have [access] to the government.’42 
 
As discussed at the beginning of this paper, one of the most important aspects of 
state formation is whether the government is able to generate legitimacy. Without 
some minimal legitimacy, states are commonly seen as fragile.43 Scholars have 
offered different interpretations and sources of legitimacy, but for the purpose of 
this paper, we use a strictly performance-oriented concept of legitimacy. Our 
measure is based on respondents’ assessment of whether or not the sub-national 
administration cared for community needs (never; rarely; sometimes, frequently, 
always; coded from 1 to 5). Such a measure thus assesses the perceived 
responsiveness of the state as a service provider. We acknowledge that other 
measures, referring to different concepts of legitimacy, are possible. For example, 
many scholars have pointed to the importance of procedural legitimacy, where 
legitimacy is obtained when leaders are chosen by, and act upon, transparent and 
accepted procedures.44 Here we focus, however, only on one core aspect of 
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generating legitimacy, i.e. performance legitimacy as measured by the 
respondents’ perceptions of whether the sub-national administration cares about 
the needs of the population (see Figure 3). 
In 2007, 68.1% of our respondents said that the sub-national administration 
‘rarely’ or ‘never’ took care of the communities. In 2009 even more respondents 
(80.3%) said that this ‘rarely’ or ‘never’ happened. In 2011 however, the number 
dropped to 71.3%, and then to 58.5% in 2013 before it climbed again to 63.5% in 
in 2015. 
Conversely, in 2007, 29.4% of respondents answered that the sub-national 
administration ‘sometimes’, ‘frequently’ or ‘always’ took care of the communities. 
In 2009 the number even dropped to 13.6%. In 2011, the number rose to 28.05% 
and in 2011 further to 41.5%, only to drop again to 36.4% in 2015.  
Summing up, we see a positive trend between 2009 and 2013, stagnating 
thereafter. This indicates that the sub-national administration has slowly become 
more responsive. The starting point of this trend is clearly very low. We should, 
however, keep in mind that the Afghan state and especially its sub-national 
administration were hardly existent when the state building mission was launched 
in 2002. Against this backdrop, the data suggest that respondents increasingly 
experience sub-national administration as a responsive outpost of the state. The 
state, it appears, is slowly earning performance legitimacy. 
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Figure 3: Does the district or provincial administration care? Note: ‘always’ 
chosen by less than 0.2%. 
 
Government-sponsored local conflict processing 
‘The commanders solved the conflicts in the Mujahidin government. The 
government of Taliban solved the conflict in the regime of Taliban. The 
elders and members of the CDC [Community Development Council] solve 
the conflict in the government of Mr. Karzai. If people refer to the 
government and the government send back to the CDC to solve it.’45 
 
Another key aspect of statehood is the ability to manage conflicts in a predictable 
and non-disruptive way. This is especially relevant in a country that is emerging 
from decades of internal war. In order to obtain a better understanding of how 
conflicts are dealt with in rural Afghanistan and what role state actors play, we 
asked respondents to indicate which institutions they would turn to if involved in a 
dispute over natural resources. 
Many Afghan communities are involved in conflicts over natural resources 
such as water, irrigated land, or pastures. Not only can such conflicts affect the 
livelihoods of whole communities, they also often connect to political conflicts, 
involving different levels of political patronage.46 We asked respondents to rank 
the first, second, and third institution they would turn to in order to resolve 
disputes about land, water, pasture or forest. Respondents were given a list of 
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institutions, some of which belong to the realm of societal institutions (formalised 
to various degrees), and others to the realm of official state-institutions. These 
distinctions are not always clear-cut in rural Afghanistan, but a broad distinction is 
possible. Institutions that fall under the ‘societal’ category are: traditional village 
and district shuras (councils); elders; jirga; khan/arbob/malik (these are different 
names for locally influential people who in the past used to represent local 
communities vis-a-vis the state); mullah; commander; NGO. Institutions that fall 
under the ‘state-run’ category are: provincial authorities; central authorities; 
police; the wolliswol (the district governor), qazi (a local judge). Finally, there is 
the in-between category of hybrid institutions, i.e. recently introduced elected 
development councils with an official legal status but not part of the formal state 
apparatus - District Development Assemblies or DDAs and Community 
Development Councils or CDCs.47 
Traditionally, rural communities in Afghanistan were self-governing to a 
very large extent. As Thomas Barfield writes, ‘historically, rural people attempted 
to keep their problems out of government view. They avoided both the courts and 
the civil authorities’.48 However, as one of the authors of this paper discovered, 
even in fiercely self-governed areas of Afghanistan people do turn to the state – 
either for patronage, for mediation and sometimes even for procedure – when both 
self-help and local community institutions fail.49 It is therefore reasonable to 
expect that disputes over natural resources are dealt with in the first instances by 
village institutions and self-help and only as a subsequent option is the state 
involved. 
29 
 
This, indeed, seems to be the case (see details in Table 3). When 
confronted with disputes over natural resources, respondents would typically first 
turn to village elders or the village shura (the village council). Over all five waves, 
between 68% (in 2011) and 86% (in 2009) would first turn to one of these 
institutions. The next two most frequently named institutions (though well behind 
the village elders or village shura) are the mullahs and the khan.  
What is important is the marked shift from traditional to hybrid community 
institutions as first choice to deal with conflicts. From 2011 onwards the CDCs are 
gaining influence as first choices (27.9% to 46.4%), taking over from the 
traditional shuras and even replacing elders as most prominent first choice in 2015. 
This indicates a formalisation of conflict processing. A drop in informal 
strongmen like arbobs, khans or maliks on all three levels would further support a 
shift towards procedural conflict processing. However, the involvement of local 
strongmen is about the same in 2007 and 2015 (1st-3rd choice added up at 23.6% 
and 23.8% respectively).  
State-run institutions are rarely mentioned as a first or second choice. For 
example only between 0.2% and 2% of respondents would turn to the wolliswol 
(district governor) as their first choice, and only between 3.3% (2011) and 18.2% 
(2009) of respondents would turn to the wolliswol as their second choice.  
As expected, state-run institutions are picked with increasing frequency as 
a third choice. The wolliswol is the third choice for between 24.8% (in 2011) and 
43.1% (in 2013) of respondents, and the provincial authorities for between 13.6% 
(in 2011) and 28.5% (in 2015) of respondents. The trend is mostly positive across 
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the years. The dent in 2011 is likely caused by the fact that in the two target 
districts in Kunduz the district administration was severely limited in their 
performance by ongoing insurgency and counter insurgency activities. The district 
police and judges (qazi) do hardly show at all as one of the choices across the 
years.50 
These numbers suggest that local non-governmental institutions continue 
to dominate conflict management at the local level. It is evident that Afghans still 
rely to a large extent on their non-state institutions, the village council and the 
elders.51 However, we notice a pronounced shift from informal community 
institutions and informal local strongmen towards formalised community councils 
and increasing state involvement further down the line. State-run institutions are 
rarely immediately involved in conflict management; rather, they serve as a back-
up when local institutions fail.52 Only when elders or the shura are unable to 
provide a solution do rural Afghans seek the involvement of the district 
administration. The district governor then decides how to proceed further. He may 
refer the case back to the shura, authorising it via official stamp to negotiate a 
solution. He may also refer the case to the courts. Such a system does not 
necessarily imply that local, informal institutions compete with the formal state 
institutions. Rather, local community institutions can supplement state authority 
under difficult conditions.53  
However, such a hybrid system is fragile and open to being hijacked by 
powerful individuals. The reliance on self-regulation, which is to some extent 
supported by the Afghan state, also means that there are few safeguards that can 
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protect the rule of law from the rule of the gun. Furthermore, the self-reliance of 
Afghan communities is also related to a lower level of trust in state institutions. 
When asked ‘Do you think that the following institutions resolve conflicts in a just 
way (‘sometimes’ / ‘always’)?’ between 86% (2013) and 94% (2009) of 
respondents in all five survey waves answered that elders were just, and between 
76% and 93% believed the shura/CDC was just, whereas the wolliswol was 
indicated by between 37% (2011) and 60% (2009) of respondents. The scores for 
district judges and police are significantly lower across the years (on average 21% 
for the former and 17% for the latter). The overall trend between 2007 as starting 
point and 2015 as endpoint is, however, positive for all three state institutions. 
In sum, there is little evidence to suggest that formal state institutions have 
taken on a more immediate role in conflict management. Local conflict 
management is still predominantly a domain for local societal institutions. The 
government has made successful attempts to bring these institutions closer to the 
state by granting official status, formal election procedures and competencies to 
village councils, and state institutions continue to serve as a backup for when 
societal institutions fail to provide a solution. However, as long as state institutions 
are still seen as far less just and effective than local societal institutions, the self-
reliance of communities will continue. 
 
Table 3. Response to the survey question: ‘If you were involved in a conflict about 
natural resources (water, land, pasture, forest), which are the first, second and 
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third institution you would turn to resolve the conflict?’ (Percentages of all 
respondents) 
 
Paying taxes 
The ability to collect taxes is widely seen as one of the fundamental prerequisite 
for successful state building.54 Taxes are also seen as one of the key aspects of the 
social contract between state and society: the state acquires the right to tax its 
population in exchange for the provision of basic services. Our research into state-
formation in Afghanistan would not be complete without investigating taxation. 
We asked respondents to indicate whether they had paid taxes in the 
preceding year. We differentiate between taxes paid to the state (‘state taxes’), and 
ushr (a traditional Islamic tax on agricultural produce). 
‘State taxes’ captures the Afghan income tax paid by individuals and 
corporations to the state. Afghanistan introduced new tax legislation in 2002 and 
has made significant progress in tax collection. The lion's share of taxes still stems 
from large corporate taxpayers, many of which are contractors for foreign donors 
and foreign military. As is the case in most poor countries, personal income tax 
hardly contributes to overall tax revenues. Afghans who earn less than $100 a 
month don't have to pay taxes. Given the widespread poverty among Afghan 
farmers, it is clear that rural Afghanistan is not a promising tax-base. It is therefore 
not surprising that most farmers do not pay state taxes. According to our data (see 
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Table 4), between 0.5% (in 2011) and 4.1% (in 2009) of respondents said they 
paid taxes to the state.  
We then looked at how many respondents answered they paid ushr. Ushr, 
which literally means one-tenth, is a traditional Islamic tax on agricultural 
produce. Giving ten per cent of the net yield of agricultural produce is seen as a 
religious duty. Our data shows that between 34.1% (in 2007) and 65.8% (in 2015) 
said that they paid ushr.  
 
Table 4. Did your household pay state taxes or ushr in the preceding year? 
 
Because ushr is strictly speaking not a tax that is paid to and collected by 
the state, but rather a religiously mandated act of charity, it is to a certain extent up 
to the farmers to whom they chose to give ushr. Most Muslim farmers around the 
world pay their ushr locally and individually to the poor. But because ushr is a 
religious duty (as opposed to a secular law), its interpretation is open to debate, 
and powerful actors who claim to have the authority over the rightful 
interpretation of religion often also demand the right to collect ushr. In years past, 
the Taliban as well as jihadi commanders and militias, routinely taxed Afghan 
farmers by making reference to ushr as a religious duty. According to a UNDP 
report, levying ushr on opium poppy generated up to 100 million USD in tax 
revenues to the Taliban regime.55 
Our data reveals to whom farmers paid ushr between 2007 and 2015 (see 
Figure 4). Up until 2015 a declining majority paid ushr to the poor within their 
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community or kin group (between 57.5% and 88.6%). However, in 2015, only 
45.4% said they paid ushr directly to the poor. Instead of paying ushr directly to 
the needy traditionally many Afghans paid to religious organisations or 
representatives (madrassas, mosques). Here we observe strong shifts between 
6.5% in 2011 and 33.9% in 2013. These shifts seem to correlate with ushr 
extracted as a ‘religious’ tax by the informal armed groups on both sides: the 
Taliban and commanders of anti-Taliban militias, both of which trend together in 
terms of tax extraction (14.1% vs 21.2% in 2011 and 11.3% vs 26.0% in 2015). 
This, of course, coincides with the Taliban offensive after 2009 and the COIN 
efforts thereafter. It can be assumed that those farmers who paid ushr to the 
Taliban or the militias did not pay voluntarily, but were forced to do so by societal 
actors who were powerful enough to create for themselves a tax base.56 
Our data then points to two interesting observations: Firstly, it appears that 
the social contract in Afghanistan does not include taxation. Hardly any rural 
households paid taxes to the state. This may signal that widespread poverty makes 
rural taxation uninteresting for the Afghan state, or that the state simply lacks the 
capacity and will to effectively collect taxes in rural areas, or both.  
Secondly, households pay ushr much more often than state taxes, and the 
share of respondents who pay ushr is increasing. In 2015, more households paid 
ushr than in 2007. We see two possible explanations. Either, the role of Islam is 
becoming more pronounced in rural society and therefore paying ushr as a 
religious and moral obligation has become more widespread. Or, social 
organizations have managed to usurp the right to collect ushr. Our data provide 
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some evidence for this second explanation. After 2009, Taliban and local militias 
increasingly succeeded in usurping a fair share of ushr tax. This level dropped 
again when the militias were formalised as Afghan Local Police and subordinated 
under state control, and when the Taliban lost much of their territorial control in 
2013 only to increase again in 2015, when after the withdrawal of most 
international forces the Taliban reasserted their control and underfinanced militias 
started to generate their own revenues again.57 
 
Figure 4. To whom you paid ushr. 
Findings and discussion 
Using household-level survey data and additional qualitative interviews as well as 
regular field-research in the research area accompanying the two-yearly 
assessments, we traced the process of state-formation in Northeast Afghanistan. 
Our data reveal a number of interesting trends.  
To start with, we saw that the state is slowly, and starting from a very low 
base, building up performance legitimacy. It appears that up to 2013 respondents 
increasingly experience the sub-national administration as a responsive outpost of 
the state. The absolute numbers are still low, yet this trend was positive and 
indicated that the state was beginning to have an impact on the everyday life of 
communities. After many years of war and absence of statehood, this can probably 
count as progress. Nevertheless, looking at the subsequent development up to 2015 
shows that the progress has been stagnating at best. 
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Turning to respondents’ assessment of how well the state provides security, 
we find that Afghans assess the government’s contribution surprisingly positive. 
The highest scores are reached in 2013, with 89.5% saying that the Afghan 
National Army (ANA) had contributed to improved security. By contrast, only 
14.3% answered this for the international military forces. These numbers suggest 
that Afghans, while blaming international military forces for deteriorating security, 
still maintain a very positive view of their own Afghan institutions and support the 
take-over of security responsibilities by Afghan forces. We also saw that the 
performance legitimacy of the police is high. A large percentage of respondents 
consistently said that police had a positive impact on the security situation. This 
positive assessment of Afghan security institutions may, to some extent, also 
reflect a positive cognitive bias towards Afghan institutions, which would lead 
respondents to overrate the real contribution to security. Yet, these assessments 
also demonstrate that Afghans recognise and appreciate the efforts of police and 
the army in a very difficult security situation. By contrast, the negative assessment 
of ISAF may reflect, as discussed, not only on the failure of Western actors to 
provide security – in fact, Western forces became a major factor for insecurity 
during the counterinsurgency campaign – but also an ideological backlash against 
Western values and Western presence. 
With regard to the provision of basic services, our data indicate that 
Afghan households recognise the significant progress that has been made across 
many sectors. Both international development actors and, increasingly, the 
government are widely credited with remarkable improvements. 
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With regard to conflict management, our data suggest that local societal 
institutions continue to dominate conflict regulation. Afghans continue to rely on 
local, non-state institutions, the village council and the elders. However, 
formalised hybrid village institutions have clearly grown in importance. State-
institutions are only approached when the local institutions appear unable to 
provide solutions. To some extent, such a system is supported by the state which 
has contributed to formalising and capacitating village institutions. This may 
signal that the state has not yet established an adequately efficient judicial 
infrastructure to deal with local conflicts and therefore prefers not only to tolerate, 
but actually to encourage informal conflict management. Furthermore, our data 
shows that respondents think the elders and village councils are fairer and less 
corrupt than state institutions when it comes to conflict management. Afghan 
communities, it appears, have thus by and large preserved their self-reliance when 
it comes to the management of conflict.58 
Not surprisingly, only very few Afghan farmers pay taxes to the state, and 
the state has not made a serious effort to collect the meagre taxes that farmers 
might be able to pay. However, many more people paid the traditional ushr tax. 
This religiously motivated tax is intended for the poor, yet in 2011 and 2015, when 
the violence between insurgents and counterinsurgents was high, more than one 
third of those who paid ushr paid it to the Taliban or to pro-government militias. 
The data then point to two interesting observations: Firstly, it appears that taxes 
are not part of the social contract in Afghanistan. Secondly, households pay ushr 
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much more often than state taxes, and a share of this is appropriated by the armed 
opposition and militias.  
In sum, these results shed light on three important aspects of state-
formation with implications that reach beyond the case of Afghanistan.  
A first and rather conspicuous implication is that state-formation is a 
process that unfolds unevenly and with different speed across different sectors. 
Clearly, not all good things go together. The data reveal a high appreciation among 
respondents for the delivery of basic services by the Afghan government. The data 
suggests that slowly rising performance legitimacy is correlated with the progress 
that has been made in sectors such as health, education, sanitation, electrification 
and transport infrastructure. In fact, in earlier papers we found that performance 
legitimacy is causally linked to service provision, thus lending empirical support 
to a longstanding argument in the aid literature that sees legitimacy as a benign 
side-effect of increased service delivery.59 Afghans also think that their sub-
national administration is slowly becoming more responsive. Finally, respondents 
also appear to highly regard the contributions of the Afghan Security Services. We 
see similar positive assessments for international development organisation, which 
are also widely credited with contributing to improved service delivery. By 
contrast, the assessment for Western security forces deteriorated. 
This recognition of the state’s increasing contribution to services is in 
contrast to the observation that village communities still clearly prefer to manage 
their conflicts internally. However, more formalised and state-recognised 
community councils are increasing replacing more traditional and informal 
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institutions like elders and traditional shuras in managing local conflicts. State-run 
district-level institutions are only involved when local institutions fail, and are far 
less trusted. We also observe that the state did not make a serious effort at 
collecting taxes in rural Afghanistan. Farmers, while rarely paying taxes to the 
state, often pay the religiously motivated ushr tax. As we have seen, this tax is 
often misappropriated by armed opposition groups and militias whenever the state 
is weak. 
A second important implication of our data is that appreciation of state-
formation by respondents is bound to be affected by a cognitive frame. As shown, 
an example of this is the divergent assessment of the ANA and the international 
military forces. The increasing negative assessment of ISAF is, as we have argued, 
not only a result of the failure to provide security, but also of an ideological 
backlash against Western military presence. By contrast, even against the 
backdrop of a deteriorating security situation, the ANA was still perceived as 
having a positive effect on security. The ANA, just like the Afghan police, 
enjoyed a good-will bonus, which made it less vulnerable to negative assessment 
once the security situation deteriorated. Likewise, once security started to improve 
again in 2011, most of the credit went to Afghan forces, while ISAFs rating would 
only marginally benefit from an improved security situation. This dynamic, we 
think, is a strong argument in favour of an Afghan-led stabilization campaign. 
Finally, our longitudinal data reveal that the process of state formation is 
fluid and very sensitive to changes in speed and direction triggered by external 
circumstances. A case in point is the security crisis of 2009 - 2011, which left clear 
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traces across all our empirical probes (with the exception of the delivery of basic 
services). As security deteriorated after 2009, the assessment of the legitimacy of 
the sub-national administration, of ISAF and of the police became more negative, 
and more paid taxes to the Taliban and to local militias. These observations 
suggest that domestic and international state-builders can rarely count on 
permanent gains, especially not as long as the security situation is volatile. In 
countries in or after conflict, respondents may adapt their beliefs relative to the 
rightfulness of the state  s claim for dominance and their behaviour towards the 
agents of that state according to the current situation and their current needs. 
However, we find a surprising high level of support for some state agents, most 
importantly the official Afghan security services. But as our research shows, 
international actors are clearly more prone than domestic actors to suddenly fall 
out of favour with the local population.  
This observation lends more support to the argument that state building 
must be, to the extent possible, an endogenous process. As our data show, despite 
the daunting challenges that they are facing, Afghans and their government have 
made considerable progress over the last decade, perhaps more than many casual 
observers acknowledge. What is very clear and – in comparison to other current 
crises like Iraq or Syria far from trivial – is that the Afghan state is still seen rather 
as part of the solution than as part of the problem by most Afghans interviewed.  
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